Bolsonaro’s Imprisonment Tests Resilience of Brazil’s Democracy
The imprisonment of previous President Jair Bolsonaro for his part in an attempted coup serves as a profound examination of the durability of Brazil’s democratic system. The future of the country will significantly hinge upon whether the traditional right-leaning political forces keep aligning with the extreme right, as witnessed throughout Bolsonaro’s leadership.
The Supreme Court of Brazil has imposed stiff sentences on Bolsonaro and seven accomplices – including three senior military officials – in a case centered around an alleged plot against democratic rule and a proposed coup. Bolsonaro’s sentence stands at 27 years and three months, but the tale does not end here.
The legal proceedings and subsequent conviction of Bolsonaro is a monumental milestone in a nation marked by past coup endeavors, some involving military actors, and periods of dictatorial rule, with the longest running from 1964 to 1985. This Supreme Court decision also situates Brazil among a limited number of countries that have thoroughly probed, charged, and tried coup instigators within the bounds of the law.
Such a trajectory naturally evokes optimism surrounding the tenacity of Brazilian democracy, which has faced its most severe trials in the recent period of Bolsonaro’s four-year rule. It’s been the harshest test since Brazil reclaimed democracy four decades ago. However, the question of whether Brazil is safeguarded against a new era of autocracy entails delving into several complexities.
The key questions arise. Will the extreme right maintain its political activism and electoral potency without the influence of its principal leader? What course will the traditional right, who collaborated with Bolsonaro without fully endorsing the coup, follow now? Do they plan to sever ties with Bolsonaro despite depending on his voter base to counteract President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the upcoming October 2026 elections?
How will this affect the dynamics of Brazil’s internal politics? Looking at the situation with the lens of a comparative analysis with the United States might be illuminating. Even though Trumpism and Bolsonarism and their founders share characteristics, it’s essential to consider the differences. Prominently, in Brazil, the collective societal actions and the legal systems have ousted the authoritarian figure from the political scenario.
Brazil’s constitution, informed by a history marked by an extended rule of authoritarianism, has certainly been beneficial for the country. The National Constituent Assembly (1987-88) enshrined provisions safeguarding democracy. Any planned attempt to dismantle it is treated as a criminal offense under Brazil’s Penal Code. Additionally, the extreme right in the country has not managed to organize a standalone, dominant party.
Multiparty systems often make it challenging to establish concrete majorities, and Brazil is no different. Unlike the U.S. where Trump managed to take over one of the two primary parties while eliminating internal opposition, Bolsonaro had to navigate the disjointed Brazilian party system. Here, the significant conservative parties prefer nurturing local alliances and congressional influence over succumbing to an authoritarian political project.
As a result, no natural successor to Bolsonaro or a party under the firm control of the extreme right has emerged. It’s little wonder then that right-leaning parties, expanding their influence in municipal councils, state governments, and the National Congress since 2018, are showing hesitance to risk political capital on a bill that might overturn the Supreme Court verdict and reinstate Bolsonaro into politics.
Most of them, for the time being, are taking an opposing stance to Bolsonaro’s conviction while bargaining in Congress for a more lenient form of amnesty. They aim to placate Bolsonaro’s supporters without triggering a new political crisis. The Supreme Court would undeniably deem an amnesty that pardoned the convicted coup leaders unconstitutional.
Contrarily, a majority of Brazilians view the situation differently. Recent survey data suggests that 54% of the population disagree with pardoning the leaders and participants of the coup plot, whereas 39% support such a course. Selecting Lula’s primary adversary in next year’s presidential competition is where the real challenge lies.
The hurdle is finding a candidate who can appeal to the extreme right while also being acceptable to non-radical conservative voters. Bolsonaro’s blessing, notorious for not honoring pacts, will be necessary for such a candidate. Some right-leaning governors assert regularly their intention to pardon Bolsonaro if they become president. But such promises are both legally intricate and inadequate to ensure Bolsonaro’s support next year.
In seeking Bolsonaro’s favor, these governors risk distance from centrist voters. It isn’t completely off the table that conservative parties, worried about short-term electoral losses, might find themselves once again involved in a strategy exclusively catering to the far right. Such a radical move may actually aid Lula’s re-election and potentially bear severe consequences for the nation. Hence, the future strength of Brazil’s democracy rests upon the allegiance of all significant political entities to its constitutional order. The non-Bolsonaro right carries immense historical responsibility in the months to come.