In the middle of the year, during a period of intense conflict in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu was gearing up to call it a stop. With negotiations with Hamas for a comprehensive cease-fire ongoing, he was primed to settle for a middle-ground approach. A representative had been dispatched to communicate Israel’s revised position to the Egypt-based mediators. At a convention held at the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, it was time for Netanyahu to persuade his cabinet to back the new plan.
The negotiation strategy was not included in the official records of the meeting. The objective was to introduce it abruptly, negating the chance for any reluctant ministers to conspire an opposing reaction. It was spring, 2024, a time much prior to Netanyahu’s unexpected political resurgence. The proposition under consideration, set to pause the ongoing Gaza hostilities for a minimum of a month and a half, would open potential avenues for discussing a lasting peace agreement with Hamas.
The plan promised the release of over thirty hostages who were seized by Hamas at the onset of the conflict, within several weeks. With an extension of the truce, even more captives would see freedom. An end to destruction in Gaza, a territory where approximately two million individuals were enduring daily assault, was in sight. If the hostilities ended, it would also increase the likelihood of a significant peace agreement with Saudi Arabia, a dominant player in the Arab world.
For multiple months, the Saudi administration had discreetly hinted at a willingness to hasten peace discussions with Israel, conditional upon the termination of Gaza’s conflict. The regulation of relationships between Saudi and Israeli administrations, an accomplishment that had eluded all Israeli leaders since the inception of the state in 1948, would certify Israel’s standing in the region and more importantly, validate Netanyahu’s long-lasting legacy.
Nevertheless, Netanyahu was confronted with stark personal jeopardy alongside the peace proposal. As the Prime Minister, he managed a delicate coalition that relied on hard-right ministers whose ambitions were to annex Gaza rather than retreat. They desired a protracted conflict that could ultimately permit Israel to reinstate Jewish settlements within Gaza.
If a cease-fire was declared prematurely, these ministers could choose to dismantle the governing coalition, thus instigating an early election which, according to opinion polls, Netanyahu stood a chance of losing. Once out of political office, Netanyahu would face precarious circumstances. In 2020, he had began defending himself against corruption allegations; charges he has continued to refute, mostly linked to providing benefits to entrepreneurs in return for presents and supportive media representation.
By losing office, Netanyahu would forfeit the power to dismiss the attorney general who supervised his trial, a power move his administration would later attempt. As the cabinet navigated other issues, an assistant rushed into the conference room with a document summing up Israel’s novel negotiation position, and subtly handed it over to Netanyahu. He perused it one more time, indicating different aspects with his pen.
The path towards a peaceful resolution posed significant risks, but he appeared prepared to take the plunge. Regardless of the personal implications and potential risks to his political career, Netanyahu seemed to recognize the critical importance of pursuing peace, for the good of his nation and the broader region.