Iran’s Perceived Security from Nuclear Armament Post Israel Conflict

The short-lived 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran has seemingly emphasized the Iranian government’s perception that acquiring nuclear weaponry is the only reliable way to maintain national security and deterrence. Given the possession of such a weapon, it’s highly doubtful that Israel would have initiated an offensive on the 13th of June 2025.

Drawing parallels with nations such as North Korea and Pakistan, which also possess nuclear arms, it’s evident that acquiring a nuclear weapon can indeed act as a security guarantee, thus deterring adversarial nuclear strikes. The correlation of national security enhancement and nuclear armament is hard to dismiss.

Though a ceasefire between Israel and Iran is currently in effect, the lingering question is how long it will last. Achieving long-lasting peace seems a far-fetched dream in the face of unresolved issues such as the Palestinian conflict.

Addressing the quandaries of Gaza, Lebanon, and the Western Bank may offer brief relief. However, true tranquility in the Middle East will remain an elusive goal unless there is effective implementation of a two-state solution.

One mildly encouraging aspect of the recent 12-day war was its relatively short duration, which prevented it from spiralling into a full-blown war of attrition. This paints a grim picture, suggesting that warfare might seem a necessary measure at times.

The subsisting ceasefire’s durability rests not primarily on goodwill, but rather on its alignment with the mutual interests of both conflicted nations. This reality underpins the fragile peace the Middle East currently beholds.

Following the cessation of hostility, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, stated that Israel had successfully accomplished two notable goals: neutralizing Iran’s nuclear potential and eliminating the perceived threat posed by its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

An interesting standpoint put forth by certain Middle Eastern scholars proposes that Iran’s possession of a nuclear bomb could paradoxically enhance regional stability. The rationale behind this thesis rests on the terrifying aftermath of a nuclear explosion that would deter all parties from resorting to such catastrophic warfare.

The key argument here is that the devastating implications of a nuclear war could deter Iran from insisting on Israel’s obliteration, thus allowing it to refocus efforts towards fostering socioeconomic growth. In a nuclear-armed scenario, Iran’s priorities may very well witness this strategic shift.

The goal of maneuvering a regime change in Iran, as pursued by both Israel and the United States, has not been successful. The risks associated with a potential regime change could potentially lead to devastating outcomes, as witnessed in the cases of Syria and Iraq.

In these instances, a power vacuum ensued, spurring immense social unrest within the country, eventually descending into conditions reminiscent of a civil war. These examples serve as stark reminders of the potential adverse consequences of destabilizing an existing regime.

If Iran were to acquire a nuclear bomb, it’s doubtful that they would resort to its application. Though this sentiment may be controversial, it’s worth considering that Iran, like any other nation, is not inherently inclined towards self-destruction.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the decision-making process of Iran’s leadership is as rational as that of their counterparts in the U.S. and Israel. Notwithstanding the existence of certain contentious policies, Iran’s leadership does not deviate from reasoning and rationality.