Asia Faces Unexpected Internet Shutdown: A Look at Potential Causes

Asia, including India and parts of Western Asia, experienced an unexpected interruption in internet connectivity due to cuts in undersea cables located within the Red Sea region on a recent Sunday. The specifics surrounding the cause of this incident remain unclear, inviting a range of expert speculations. Previously, suspicions had been aimed at Yemen’s Houthi rebel group, in the context of a broader Red Sea campaign which they have identified as a strategy to influence Israel’s interactions with Hamas concerning Gaza Strip tensions. The rebels, however, have categorically rejected these theories about their involvement in past cable damages.

The most recent series of underwater cable issues in the Red Sea has significantly impacted the digital connectivity of several nations, impairing online communication and data exchange processes. The countries most impacted by these unexpected technical glitches include India and Pakistan, both of which are heavily dependent on their digital networks for functioning of various industries. However, it is believed that the origin of this problem can be traced back to a malfunction in the SMW4 and IMEWE cable systems in the vicinity of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Two key players in the cable management industry are associated with these affected cables – the South East Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 4 (SMW4) cable is managed by an Indian conglomerate, and the India-Middle East-Western Europe (IMEWE) cable falls under the purview of a separate consortium. The functionality of these cables could impose significant impacts on digital communication not only within the relevant countries, but also potentially on a more global scale. Unfortunately, there has been no immediate response from either of these entities that could shed light on the current situation.

Saudi Arabia, another key nation within the reach of these cables, has not publicly recognized the disruption of this significant digital infrastructure. Authorities have also not responded to the queries about the incident, leading to a potential wall of uncertainty surrounding the situation. This paucity of information further complicates the task of understanding the nature of this predicament and thereby devising practical, effective solutions.

Simultaneously, the effects of this undersea cable malfunction have permeated into the United Arab Emirates as well. Users employing the country’s state-owned networks within the metropolis hubs of Dubai and Abu Dhabi have reported a reduction in their internet speed. The Emirati government, however, has yet to issue an official statement acknowledging this noticeable network slowdown.

The problem is not simply limited to slower internet speeds. In Western Asia, internet users are also likely to face increased latency due to the unexpected circumstances in the Red Sea cable systems. Though still functioning, the compromised efficiency of these undersea fibers produces significant repercussions on the quality of digital user experience and online activities across this region.

The incident of the cables being severed emerges in times of escalating tension, as Yemen’s Houthi rebels remain engaged in a consistent pattern of attacks against Israel. The latter has reciprocated with retaliatory airstrikes, including one that eliminated several high-ranking individuals within the rebel outfit. However, any direct linkage between these conflicts and the cable disruptions remain speculative.

In early 2024, Yemen’s globally acknowledged government in exile flagged the possibility of the Houthis attacking undersea cables in the Red Sea. Subsequent cable damages lent some credence to these accusations, but the Houthis continued to deny the allegations, maintaining their stance of non-involvement. A Sunday morning marked the first official acknowledgement of such a disruptive event since these reports were issued.

In the span of a year, from November 2023 to December 2024, the Houthi rebels targeted more than 100 ships, using missiles and drones as their weapons of choice. This was enacted as part of their campaign over the course of the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip. In their relentless assault thus far, the Houthis have claimed four vessels and at least eight mariners lives.

However, in a rare turn of events, the Houthis chose to halt their attacks during a brief lull in the ongoing war. This temporary cessation of violence was then followed by an intensively persistent air campaign against the rebels, shifting the balance of the conflict and adding more complexity to an already fraught situation.

Continuing their maritime damaging methodology, the Houthis sank two vessels in July, claiming the lives of at least four on board crew members, with others feared to have been captured by the rebel forces. This newly initiated wave of assault from the Houthis seems to tip the precarious balance of a potential ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.

In a collateral theatre of conflict, the fate of ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran is in a precarious state, due to question marks over the future of Iran’s beleaguered nuclear program. Israel’s unexpected launch of a 12-day long combat against Iran seems to have thrown an additional wrench in these discussions. During this combat phase, American forces have taken down three Iranian nuclear sites, adding a new facet to the dynamically evolving geopolitical scenario.