France’s Bold Journey to Nuclear Energy Supremacy
In the 1970s, the seemingly invincible era of nuclear power seemed at risk of collapse. Skyrocketing costs, shifting regulations, and a rising tide of public disapproval made industry claims that electricity would soon become ‘too cheap to meter’ seem unfounded. Following its peak in 1973, orders for new nuclear reactors in the US dropped to zero by 1979, even as oil crises caused electricity prices to double. In the UK, a poorly managed attempt to develop advanced gas reactors led to costs running over by half and a significant delay. Amidst this global withdrawal, France stood out as it intensified its nuclear endeavors.
While most of the world was retreating, France began construction on 37 out of the 57 reactors currently operating within its borders during the 1970s. As a result, France has mostly eliminated carbon from its power grid. A remarkable 94% of electricity in France now comes from low carbon sources, with nuclear power contributing 70 percentage points to this total. However, France’s success in nuclear energy was far from certain and was a product of a bold political shift, regulatory streamlining, and a tax system that made communities keen to host nuclear power plants.
During the previous decade of the 1960s, France lagged behind in nuclear energy production. Hindered by ineffective technology choices and internal disagreements, France’s nuclear industry was met with scorn at home and abroad. The ultimate success of the country’s nuclear program hinged upon a brave change in political direction, attention to regulatory details, and an incentivization system that motivated local communities to embrace nuclear power plants.
Post World War II, during the challenging period of national rebuilding, Charles de Gaulle, the interim leader, decided that France should possess nuclear weapons. As a result, French nuclear pursuits were divided between two competing entities. The Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA), established in 1945, was charged with producing plutonium for the emerging nuclear weapons program, while Électricité de France (EDF), founded a year later, was given the responsibility to manage the country’s electricity grid.
Initially, EDF was not concentrated on nuclear power since its resources were largely invested in rebuilding and reorganizing the war-ravaged electrical grid. These factors meant that fuel rods could be plucked while the reactor operated, enabling the plant to obtain the weapons-grade plutonium formed in the fission reaction before it could be ruined by other isotopes. By 1956, the CEA completed its first full-scale reactor, Marcoule G1.
However, the resulting reactor that was finally completed in 1962 was an unwelcome compromise, offering 11 years of mediocre performance before its decommissioning in 1973. This strained partnership produced two more gas-graphite reactors at the same location, EDF2 (completed in 1965), and EDF3 (finished in 1966). In the meantime, the US company Westinghouse, the developer of the pressurized water reactor (PWR), initiated a worldwide promotional campaign.
Westinghouse’s marketing strategy emphasized reduced capital costs, which won favor with EDF. The company arrived at the conclusion that the ‘sovereignty’ provided by using natural uranium did not warrant the inefficiency of gas-graphite plants. Several technical failures during EDF3’s fueling, leading to a summer filled with negative press commentary, only fortified this belief, leading to a shift away from the homegrown designs.
Change was finally within reach when De Gaulle, a champion of a uniquely French design, left the presidency and Georges Pompidou took the helm. By 1970, after convincing the French cabinet and planning commission, EDF began construction on two trial pressurized water reactors at Fessenheim, near the German and Swiss borders. EDF had effectively made the case that supporting affordable, dependable electricity was more patriotic than constructing an inefficient all-French reactor.
Global oil prices soared in 1973 due to an embargo imposed by a coalition of Arab countries against nations that backed Israel in the Yom Kippur War that year. The resulting Messmer Plan led to an unprecedented acceleration in nuclear construction, both in the number of reactors built and capacity added – a record unmatched even by China, which boasts the most efficient regulatory process and a highly developed industrial base.
One of EDF’s significant advantages lay in a preapproved list of suitable locations, and reactors were bought in large numbers using a standardized design. This approach eliminated any need for a complex site-licensing procedure. Meanwhile, safety standards were established discretely via a ‘technical dialogue’ process involving EDF, the CEA, and other government experts.
Framatome, a Franco-American consortium that secured licensing rights for Westinghouse’s technology, was responsible for much of the plant’s production. EDF took the lead role in engineering and put significant efforts into cost control despite the absence of traditional competition. For example, Framatome had the freedom to invest in a facility specializing in producing heavy-duty components like vessels, pressurizers, and pipes.
Surprisingly, France’s nuclear expansion during the 1970s faced little opposition, which was comparatively weak compared to other major economies. A major factor was the structure of the Fifth Republic’s constitution, adopted in 1958, which endorsed a strong presidency and a weak legislature, providing little legal oversight of nuclear policy and making decisions less susceptible to lobbying or public opinion.
Furthermore, unlike other European countries where unions aligned with environmentalists, in France, the communist party derived substantial support from the labor force associated directly with the nuclear industry or its support structure. This led to strong trade unions that were either apathetic or outright hostile towards the emerging environmentalist movement. Surprisingly, in 1987, the year following the Chernobyl disaster, France was the only major western country where popular support for nuclear energy exceeded its opposition.
This supportive context created local communities that actively lobbied for new power plants. Revenue for Avoine, the commune which hosted the first EDF reactors, surged from a few tens of thousands of francs in the mid-1950s to nine million a year by the time EDF2 and EDF3 were operational. Thanks to this fiscal boost, local residents paid just 0.1 percent in taxes, compared to the 12 percent regional average.
However, France’s nuclear story is not without its shortcomings. Construction costs doubled per unit of electricity between the 1970s and late 1990s, but in comparison to a fourfold increase in costs in the US, France seems to have managed relatively well. Furthermore, as new projects like Hinkley Point C in the UK, Vogtle 3 & 4 in the US, and Flamanville in France are becoming more costly, the French approach appears increasingly favorable.
Despite wavering political attitudes during the 2010s, culminating in the closure of Fessenheim’s reactors, France is seeing a revival of nuclear energy thanks to ongoing geopolitical uncertainties. The country is now considering building six new reactors and examining the potential for a small modular reactor program to ensure it remains a leading power in nuclear energy.