The Islamic Republic of Iran has hinted at its willingness to recommence nuclear discussions with Washington, signaling a pragmatic stance in international relations in the face of troubling realities. The backdrop to this development was the Israeli military aggression against Iran on June 13, which preempted the sixth round of the Iran-US nuclear dialogue scheduled to be held in Muscat. Following a 12-day crossfire with Israel, Iranian authorities were compelled to make a few significant public declarations. Under the guidance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Iranian administration announced its ‘triumph’ over Israel and a symbolic ‘reprisal’ against the US.
Affiliated regime social media accounts widely reported various triumphs, highlighting the destruction and impairment of Israeli military facilities. These posts boasted about the Israeli defense systems’ failure to neutralize Iranian drones and missile attacks. Some even inferred that it was Israel, not Iran, that requested a ceasefire, implying that Iran was in the position to prolong its military endeavors. Extended uncertainties concerning the results and magnitude of the Israeli-US strikes on nuclear sites buttressed Iran’s narrative.
Iranian strategists made a series of politically charged moves amidst these skirmishes. By July 2, President Masoud Pezeshkian had ratified a legislation to halt collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The impression was fostered that Iran may choose to follow North Korea’s path and take the drastic measure of retreating from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Much like the preludes to the 2015 nuclear arrangement, Iran discerned the European contingents as susceptible links. The Iranian Foreign Minister cautioned that sustained or deepened UN sanctions would eventually disable Europe’s ability to partake in the negotiations. Over and above this, Iran firmly refuted any prospects of carrying forward nuclear discussions, especially under the Trump Administration’s insistent stance on ‘zero enrichment’.
However, Tehran’s theologians, while philosophically rooted, rhetorical, and dogmatic, are not inclined to self-destruction. They have survived for four decades based on realistic accommodations and policy reversals. For instance, Ayatollah Khomeini, after persistently waging war with Iraq, acquiesced to drink ‘a cup of poison’ and signed a ceasefire agreement in July 1988. Similarly, today’s ‘poison’ is represented by a sobering and difficult reality in the Middle East.
When the aerial attacks ceased, Iran found itself in a state of regional isolation. Notwithstanding that all the key actors expressed a desire for a swift conclusion to the Israel-Iran standoff, and many publicly criticized Israel for its infringements on Iranian sovereignty, none came forth to Iran’s aid. Other than the Houthis of Yemen, even Iran’s allied entities – such as Hamas, Hezbollah or PMF in Iraq – remained disengaged from the conflict.
A number of Arab nations, including Jordan, Syria, and potentially Saudi Arabia, proactively thwarted potential Iranian missile threats that trespassed over their sovereign spaces. Indeed, Israel seems to have exploited Syrian airspace to launch its own attacks on Iran. Notably, Israeli officials have expressed that the Trump Administration has not hindered Israel from continuing to target Iranian nuclear installations in the future if needed.
The Israeli utilization of internal displeasure against the Iranian rule played vitally in the on-ground assaults within Iran. Afghan immigrants, currently estimated at roughly six million, were primary targets, and in June alone, over two hundred and fifty thousand refugees were forcibly repatriated to Afghanistan. The Iran-Israel clash seems to have further amplified the Iranian determination, despite this troubling deportation trend having started earlier.
Coincidentally, other global powers maintained diplomatic discretion. Given his past experiences with Bashar al-Assad, President Vladimir Putin approached the situation with extreme care. Conversely, President Xi has escalated tensions with Israel over the Gaza Strip but refrained from aligning with a confrontational Iran.
In defiance of the tension, Iran and its representatives have narrated the face-off with Israel as the cost paid for their unyielding support for the Palestinian cause. Hence, only Palestinian officials have shown interest in openly associating with Iran in foreign countries.
Iran’s clergy, entering its fourth decade, confronts an array of internal challenges – ranging from economic and political to socio-religious dimensions. While crises often inspire rallying behind a government, the silence at the war front only resurfaces latent public displeasure. The clergy is acutely conscious of such circumstances.
If one seeks an insight into the Iran’s revived interest in renewing nuclear dialogue with the US, these domestic predicaments serve as a likely motivator. As expressed by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian administration is considering the ‘timing, location, form, components, and demanded guarantees’ of these potential talks.
The reinstatement of such discussions will take time and will necessitate numerous assurances before and after the agreement. However, the wheels of progress have been set in motion. As a fitting paraphrase of Bernard Shaw, Iran has agreed on principles and is now negotiating the terms.