During a 2007 discussion, former General Wesley Clark disclosed that the Pentagon had designed a strategy to ‘neutralize seven countries in a span five years,’ namely, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. Over the subsequent 20 years, the initial six nations faced bombings, were destabilized, or descended into internal conflicts. Iran stands tall, so far, remaining impervious to Western monetary control, intrinsically averse to global financial exploitation, while protecting some of the oldest archeological treasures on the planet.
Mainstream media frequently sound the alarm about imminent cyber warfare and advisories urge us to prepare for potential Iranian digital assaults on allied nations, targeting crucial structures like power grids and water systems. However, the more essential inquiry is not about defense mechanisms but an assessment of the true perpetrator. Is Iran the actual antagonist, or is it being cast as the fall guy for incidents designed to fortify elite dominions both overseas and domestically?
A review of recent history provides an unmistakable trend. Whenever turmoil breaks out, both government and corporate might swiftly strengthen. Consider the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks when US authorities introduced the Patriot Act, introduced warrantless surveillance, and allowed indefinite custody, all under the banner of national safety. The 2008 economic fallout resulted in sizable bank rescues and expedited fiscal consolidation.
Similarly, in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic made lockdown measures, QR-coded health certificates, and arguments for digitized health-record linked identity systems commonplace. As the author expounded in her influential book, The Shock Doctrine, elites typically leverage crises to expedite policies usually opposed by the masses. The subsequent panic over cyber threats matches this narrative.
Imagine if a catastrophic digital incident were to occur, taking down hospitals, financial institutions, or energy infrastructures. The remedy that is discretely being interlaced into the public conversation is the implementation of the worldwide ‘Digital ID’ framework. The World Economic Forum acknowledges the critical role digital IDs could play in digitizing trade and nurturing a global digital economy.
In the Digital Identity Blueprint furnished by the WEF, a design is suggested that binds online activities, financial services, travel permissions, and even personal behavior data to a unified identity. However, what is marketed as a solution for ‘security’ sets the groundwork for a technocratic control matrix. If set in motion, the Digital ID would act as the master key to all domains of your life: your finances, health records, internet access, and even your freedom to travel.
Over time, it is conceivable that the scope of Digital ID merges with carbon limits and societal credit scoring mechanisms. An algorithm, not a constitution, would become the arbiter of your rights. One misplaced opinion could leave you excluded from society, not by law enforcement, but by programming. Consequently, you would instinctively refrain from expressing dissenting opinions and surveil yourself.
However, the basic assumption that Iran would initiate such a cyberattack is flawed. Iran’s cyber warfare capabilities are comparatively less advanced than those of nations like the US, Israel, Russia, or China. The National Cyber Power Index by the Harvard Belfer Center ranks Iran considerably low on its global list. While Iran might execute trivial digital nuisance tactics, it does not possess the means to render critical US infrastructure nonfunctional.
Should a substantial cyberattack transpire, pointing fingers at Iran might fulfill a political objective, not necessarily mirror the truth. Iran offers a convenient antagonist narrative, but its resistance to integration into the Western-oriented financial system makes it a strategic target for power transition.
Recently in 1983, Iran transitioned its entire banking system to align with sharia principles, formally outlawing interest (riba). Unlike other countries with Muslim majorities that generally adhere to AAOIFI guidelines, Iran pursues its own framework and substantially diverges from the global Islamic banking standards. Iran symbolizes a detour from the typical pathway of IMF-led global monetary policies.
Furthermore, its Islamic banking model forbids the accumulation of interest on loans, a defining essence of Western debt-fueled finance. Adding to its uniqueness, Iran is home to some of the most ancient archaeological sites globally, such as Persepolis and the Elamite ruins, which predate the majority of documented human history.
A conflict with Iran could simultaneously serve dual objectives. Internationally, it could establish a Western-friendly central banking system, unseal Iranian markets, and provide access to cultural and historical artifacts. Domestically, a cyberattack attributed to Iran could expedite the acceptance of Digital IDs, intensify control on digital platforms, and chip away at civil rights, all in the pretense of ‘security.’
It is plausible that Iran may not plan or even desire to launch a cyberattack. But should such an event occur and the press hastily lays the blame at Iran’s doorstep, we must probe deeper. Who indeed profits? Who possesses the required capability? Who has been systematically making preparations for years? The key inquiry isn’t, will Iran breach our digital defences? It is, when they attribute the act to Iran, will you willingly forfeit your liberty?