While President Donald Trump continues to calm relations with Chinese President Xi Jinping, we should not anticipate an immediate agreement following the pair’s phone call. This is attributed to the way the Chinese government operates, says Nicholas Burns, who recently concluded a three-year term as U.S. ambassador to China. Burns posits that negotiations could last for several months. His ambassadorial post exposed him to the ups and downs of geopolitical ties, marked by debates over China’s purported role in the outbreak of Covid-19, the Chinese spy balloon episode, and mounting tensions over trade and Taiwan’s future.
Burns’ career in diplomacy started back in 1980, beginning with an internship at the U.S. embassy in Mauritania. His service includes stints as U.S. ambassador to NATO and roles under presidents of both major parties. His first visit to China came in 1988 alongside then–Secretary of State George Schultz. At the time, China’s GDP stood at $312 billion, the country was in the initial stages of exploring grassroots democratic elections, and Xi Jinping was the executive vice-mayor of Xiamen city, Fujian province. Fast forward thirty-six years, and China’s GDP jumped to $19 trillion, with Xi Jinping as the undisputed supremo of a progressively more oppressive authoritarial government.
Burns shared his viewpoint on the need to counteract Beijing’s increasingly assertive economic, diplomatic and military global presence. However, he argues that Trump’s approach, primarily the use of tariffs to fight long-term partners, is flawed. Burns criticizes this as a considerable error that the current administration is now trying to rectify. The focus of his fears about U.S.-China relations is the difficulty to convince the Chinese that it is beneficial for both countries to have frequent high-level military communications.
Burns’ worst nightmare wasn’t an intentionally initiated conflict, but an accidental one. Given the proximity of American and Chinese naval operations around islands and the Taiwan Strait, any accident could quickly escalate if not properly managed. Burns pressed the importance of top military officers’ ability to intervene and de-escalate potential crises, but the People’s Liberation Army was initially resistant to this level of contact, causing significant concern.
The current state of U.S.-China relations shares many commonalities with the time when Burns left his post in Beijing. Current points of contention are echoes of unresolved issues from the past, and the Trump administration continues to grapple with navigating a relationship with a country that is both a formidable adversary and a necessary partner in certain issues. Despite the challenges, Burns noted that he spends more time on competitive aspects with China, with a part of it dedicated to cooperative issues, and thinks the Trump administration has a similar allocation.
During the Biden administration, the China strategy emphasized strengthening ties with allies to counter Beijing’s growing influence. Conversely, Trump’s approach centers on tariffs and trade. In Burns’ opinion, this approach had a rocky start, mainly because it alienated potential allies who might otherwise have sided with the U.S. against China. According to Burns, forming a coalition with these countries rather than antagonizing them with tariffs could have brought leverage during dialogues with China.
The Chinese government and Trump administration have engaged enduring tariff wars without obvious winners. Burns expects a trade deal eventually to come to fruition, as common sense and self-interest are bound to dictate it. Nonetheless, for such an agreement to be reached, both parties should see some benefit. In the past, China may have had an inferiority complex when dealing with the U.S., but nowadays, China perceives itself as a peer, and they are determined not to be cast as the defeated party.
Despite the Trump administration’s belief that they can coerce Beijing into submission through tariffs, Burns doubts the realism of this perception. It’s critical to understand that today’s China sees itself as a coequal to the U.S. in economic, technological and military measures, thanks to the deification of China’s President Xi Jinping by the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, any idea of humiliating or subjugating Xi Jinping in a trade war with the U.S. would be strongly opposed. While tariff wars will likely leave neither side victorious, Burns believes a trade deal is still achievable.
The long-term outlook depends heavily on the Chinese government’s desire for stability in its relationship with the United States. Their economy faces challenges, and they are concerned about slow GDP growth and a significant drop in foreign direct investment. They also worry about foreign corporations second-guessing their commitments due to the strained relations between the governments and the poor governance within China. Therefore, China wants to maintain its market share in the U.S. and preserve its export opportunities.
Burns believes one of the biggest misconceptions the U.S. has about China is the belief that China only imitates and steals intellectual property from the U.S. Rather, China is a formidable competitor with significant talent in science and technology. They are investing large sums of money into state-backed champions to secure a consistent technological advantage. This feat is often not well-understood or underestimated by many in the U.S. who maintain outmoded views of China.
Moreover, Burns tackled the potential damage to U.S. soft power caused by the Trump administration’s dismantling of entities such as USAID, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America. He dubbed the dissolution of USAID as a cataclysmic mistake for the U.S., as it sent a wrong global message. China was quick to capitalize on this by portraying the U.S. as uninterested in other nations.
Finally, Burns states that even amidst competition and contention with the Chinese government, it’s crucial to keep personal ties open with the Chinese people. He considers the influx of Chinese students to the U.S. and vice versa as a benefit, as it ensures continued mutual understanding. He disapproves of the Trump administration’s plan to rigorously revoke the visas of Chinese students studying in critical fields in the U.S., calling it a strategic misstep.
Ultimately, Burns acknowledges that the U.S. and China will be locked in a structural rivalry due to their positions as leading economies and militaries with contrasting political philosophies. Nevertheless, competing successfully and managing conflicts effectively with a view to peaceful coexistence is key.